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The separation of ownership and control in a corporation leaves
the shareholder vulnerable to unfair treatment by management.'
Transactions between the corporation and an interested director
present such an opportunity for abuse of shareholder interests. 2
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that conflicts of interest in-
volving management may be effectively controlled in three ways.3
First, shareholders can carry out the management functions them-
selves. Secondly, market incentives can be utilized whereby a di-
rector's best interests will be served by maximizing shareholder
interests. Finally, legal rules and sanctions may be used to deter
unwanted self-dealing. 4 This note will discuss the third type of
control, specifically, Nebraska's statutory response to the problem
of the interested director.5
Section 21-2040.01 was added to the Business Corporation Act in
1972,6 but has yet to be interpreted by the Nebraska Supreme
Court. The statute is modeled after Section 41 of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act and establishes a means whereby directors
may contract or transact with their corporation if statutory tests
are satisfied.8 Section 41 of the Model Act was patterned after the
1. See A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
6 (1933).
2. See Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transac-
tions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 201
(1977). The law finally came to view the "interested director" as a necessary
evil, a recurring problem which had to be dealt with realistically.
3. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: E~ficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure,
25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 738 (1978).
4. Id. at 777.
5. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2040.01 (Reissue 1974). For the entire Nebraska Busi-
ness Corporation Act, see id. §§ 21-2001 to -20,134 (Reissue 1977).
6. LB. 1182, 1972 Neb. Laws.
7. 1 AMERcAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION AcT ANNo-
TATED § 41 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as MODEL AT ANN.].
8. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2040.01 (Reissue 1974):
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interested director statutes of California, New York, Delaware, and
New Jersey.9 Therefore, to understand section 21-2040.01 and pre-
dict how the Nebraska courts will construe it, a review of judicial
interpretations of other "interested director" statutes with similar
provisions 10 is required.
II. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 21-2040.01
A. Background
The common law developed its own standards in resolving di-
rector conflicts of interest, initially declaring all interested transac-
tions voidable at the option of the corporation." This rigid position
No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or
more of its directors or any other corporation, firm, association or en-
tity in which one or more of its directors or officers are financially
interested, shall be either void or voidable because of such relation-
ship or interest or because such director or directors are present at
the meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which
authorizes, approves or ratifies such contract or transaction or be-
cause his or their votes are counted for such purpose if:
(1) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or
known to the board of directors or committee which authorizes,
approves or ratifies the contract or transaction by a vote or con-
sent sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes or con-
sents of such interested directors;
(2) The fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed to the
shareholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve or ratify
such contract or transaction by vote or written consent; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the cor-
poration. Common or interested directors may be counted in de-
termining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of
directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or
ratifies such contract or transaction.
9. The following state statutes were in existence at the time section 41 of the
Model Act was drafted: CAL. CORP. LAw § 820 (West 1955); DEL CODE tit. 8,
§ 144 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8 (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 713
(McKinney 1963) (amended 1971). The California statute has been replaced
by a more liberal statute. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1977). Basically
the new statute provides more definite validation procedures and removes
the fairness requirement in certain situations. References in this article to
the California statute are to section 820 after which the Nebraska Statute was
patterned. New York's statute was revised in 1971; reference to section 713 as
amended will only be in the context of those provisions which are applicable
to section 21-2040.01.
10. Although "interested director" statutes vary somewhat from state to state,
their basic pattern is the same-that contracts with the corporation are per-
missible if (1) approved by the board or shareholders, or (2) if the transac-
tion is found to be fair to the corporation.
11. For analyses of the common law principles which laid the foundation for "in-
terested director" statutes, see Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of In-
terest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966); Note, "Interested
Director's" Contracts-Section 713 of the New York Business Corporation
Law and the Fairness Test, 41 FoRDHAm L REV. 639 (1973).
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against interested director transactions subsequently eroded. By
1960 the general rule could be stated thus:
[N] o transaction of a corporation with any or all of its directors was auto-
matically voidable at the suit of a shareholder, whether there was a disin-
terested majority of the board or not; but .... the courts would review
such a contract and subject it to rigid and careful scrutiny, and would in-
validate the contract if it was found to be unfair to the corporation.
1 2
This principle became the cornerstone of the interested director
statute around which the procedural provisions were built. Unfor-
tunately, the certainty these statutes were to bring to interested
director transactions never materialized. Judicial construction
and application of the statutory provisions has varied. As one com-
mentator noted: "These provisions received mixed reviews from
the legal community. While most authorities favored the statute's
approach, it was generally conceded that it raised as many ques-
tions as it resolved."' 3
B. Purposes of Statute
The drafters of the Model Act stated that the purpose of section
41 was
to establish statutory guidlines for determining the validity of transac-
tions between a corporation and one or more of its directors, or between
corporations having common directors, or between a corporation and an-
other entity in which a director of the corporation is financially interested.
It validates if the prescribed tests are satisfied, transactions with inter-
ested directors which common law rules often make voidable, if not
void.14
The section, in addition to applying to interested director trans-
actions, 15 also permits transactions between corporations with in-
terlocking boards. In Nebraska, officers of the corporation are not
within the scope of section 21-2040.01 in contrast to many states
which expressly include officers with directors in their statutes. 16
12. Marsh, supra note 11, at 43.
13. Note, supra note 11, at 647-48 (footnotes omitted).
14. 1 MODEL ACT ANN. § 41, 2., at 842 (Comment). This statement should apply
equally to section 21-2040.01, as it is patterned directly after section 41.
15. In 1962, the New York Stock Exchange listed the most common conflicts of
interests which involve directors: (1) the direct or indirect ownership of
property leased to the company; (2) sales or purchases of goods or services to
or from organizations the director has an interest in; and (3) ownership by
directors of the parent company of a portion of the minority equity in subsidi-
aries. Nolan, Today's Director, 20 N.Y.L-F. 313, 337 (1974). The use of the
word "transaction" enables the statute to apply to many situations which
would not be reachable under the term "contract." Therefore it is possible
that director involvement in situations such as dissolution, usurpation of cor-
porate opportunity, and dividend policies would be under the purview of the
statute. See Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 2, at 205 n.33.
16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144 (1974).
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Since Nebraska does not do so, it would seem that self-dealing of-
ficers in Nebraska would be subject to common law principles gov-
erning such conduct which were developed prior to the passage of
section 21-2040.01.
The enactment of these statutes represented a backlash against
the harsh stance taken against interested director transactions at
common law. However, compliance with the statute's procedural
provisions does not validate the contract or transaction for all pur-
poses. Validation under section 21-2040.01 merely serves to remove
the taint associated with the director's involvement in the transac-
tion. The comment to the Model Act conscientiously indicates this
point:
The function of section 41 is not to provide a basis for validating for all
purposes a contract or transaction between an interested director and his
corporation, but simply to establish that such contract or transaction is
not automatically void or voidable solely by reason of the director's inter-
est.17
This view was also expressed in a case involving the New York
statute,18 the court holding that "[d] espite the validity of the reso-
lution under section 713, the interested directors may in any event
be liable for having participated in a transaction from which they
may derive an indirect personal benefit."'19 Much of this inquiry
can be subsumed in the fairness requirement. Depending upon
the latitude given to the concept of fairness, the fairness test of
section 21-2040.01(3) should be sufficient to protect shareholder in-
terests in most situations involving an interested director.
I. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
Section 21-2040.01 provides that a transaction with an interested
director is valid if approved by either a disinterested board or fully
informed shareholders, or if the transaction is fair and reasonable
to the corporation.20 The use of the disjunctive "or" suggests that
the statute permits enforcement of a transaction which is unjust or
unreasonable to the corporation as long as it is approved by a dis-
interested board or informed shareholders. Such an interpretation
would be a major departure from the common law rule requiring
17. 1 MODEL ACT ANN. § 41, 2, at 844 (Comment).
18. Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 278 N.E.2d 642, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1972).
19. Id. at 402, 278 N.E.2d at 646, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 437. This principle is somewhat
subsumed in the fairness test of the statute assuming the gloss applied by
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remilard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405,241 P.2d 66
(1952), is incorporated into the statute. See notes 22-35 & accompanying text
infra. However, it is conceivable that a transaction may be fair to the corpo-
ration yet constitute a breach of the director's duty to the corporation.
20. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2040.01 (Reissue 1974). For text of statute, see note 8
supra.
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that interested director transactions be fair to the corporation. 21
The first case to deal with this structural problem was Remil-
lard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co.22 Two directors of the
manufacturing companies, the Remillard-Dandini Co. and its affili-
ate, in an effort to separate manufacturing and sales functions,
formed a sales corporation in which they owned the entire stock
interest. They then entered into sales contracts with the manufac-
turing companies which were ratified by the board of directors of
Remillard-Dandini. Although this ratification would not have sat-
isfied the requirement of board ratification under California's in-
terested director statute,23 a written consent to the sales contracts
was submitted by the majority shareholder of record.24 On appeal
of the shareholders' derivative suit the court found that the sales
contracts were profitable to the manufacturing companies2 5 and
that there was literal compliance with California's interested direc-
tor statute, as it then existed, by reason of the majority share-
holder's approval of the sales contracts. 26 Nevertheless, the court
found the contracts unfair to the manufacturing companies and ac-
cordingly voided them. In rejecting defendants' contention that
compliance with the statute's approval procedures precluded judi-
cial review of the transaction's fairness, the court held that "[e] ven
though the requirements of section 820 are technically met, trans-
actions that are unfair and unreasonable to the corporation may be
avoided."27
The importance of the Remillard holding is that it places a judi-
cial gloss upon the statute, requiring interested director transac-
tions to always meet the test of fairness despite the statutory
language indicating otherwise. One writer has cynically observed,
"the entire statute could as well have been compressed into the
final clause, '28 which requires fairness and reasonableness. How-
21. Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 2, at 207.
22. 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
23. Since the votes of the two interested directors did not count toward ratifica-
tion, there was only one director's vote in favor of ratifying the contracts
while two directors voted against ratification. See CAL CORP. LAW § 820(a)
(West 1955) (superseded by CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1977)) (requiring
ratification by a vote sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes of
the interested directors). Section 21-2040.01(1) contains the same require-
ment.
24. This satisfied the requirements of shareholder ratification under Section
820(b).
25. 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 416, 241 P.2d 66, 72 (1952).
26. Id. at 418, 241 P.2d at 73-74. See CAL. CORP. LAW. § 820(a) (West 1955) (super-
seded by CAm CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1977)). -
27. 109 Cal. App. at 418, 241 P.2d at 74. The Remillard interpretation was real-
firmed in Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260
P.2d 823 (1953).
28. Marsh, supra note 11, at 47.
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ever other commentators have concluded that the Remillard ap-
proach is wholly consistent with the intent of the drafters of
section 820.29
The Remillard approach has been followed by most jurisdic-
tions which have interpreted their respective interested director
statutes.30 In 1976, the Delaware Supreme Court, interpreting its
statute which is similar in form and substance to section 21-2040.01,
adopted the Remillard approach in Fliegler v. Lawrence.31 The
court held that directors must prove the fairness of their transac-
tions with the corporation notwithstanding shareholder ratifica-
tion:3 2 "[The statute] merely removes an 'interested director'
cloud when its terms are met and provides against invalidation of
an agreement 'solely' because such a director or officer is involved.
Nothing in the statute.., removes the transaction from judicial
scrutiny. ' 33 It has also been concluded that the Remillard gloss
was impliedly adopted by the New York legislature when it en-
acted section 713,34 since the drafters patterned the statute after
the California model and were totally aware of the Remillard inter-
pretation.35 This same argument can be made in construing sec-
tion 21-2040.01. Nebraska's adherence to the disjunctive form
contained in California's statute seems to indicate an intent to ac-
cept that jurisdiction's judicial interpretations arising from use of
the disjunctive.36 In addition, adoption of the Remillard approach
29. Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 2, at 209:
The drafters of the statute did not intend to affect the voidability of
transactions which were unfair, but to overcome the problems cre-
ated by the "involvement" of interested directors in the approval or
ratification process. Thus the statute.., was aimed at curing proce-
dural problems, not at assuring substantive fairness.
30. Bulbulia & Pinto, id. at 227.
31. 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
32. At issue was whether the shareholder ratification was effective for the pur-
pose of relieving defendants of the burden of proving fairness when two-
thirds of the shareholders voting were also interested in the transaction. This
operated to taint the ratification and prevented the burden of proof from
shifting to the plaintiff. Id. at 221. See notes 51-71 & accompanying text infra
(discussion of burden of proof principles).
33. 361 A.2d at 222. Delaware's acceptance of the Remillard approach should in-
dicate that more conservative jurisdictions would follow suit. However, the
language of section 144(a) (3) is more conducive to a Remillard interpretation
than is that of section 21-2040.01.
34. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 713 (McKinney 1963) (amended 1971).
35. Note, The Status of the Fairness Test Under Section 713 of the New York Busi-
ness Corporation Law, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1156, 1167-74 (1976).
36. The California statute served as the prototype for Section 41 of the Model Act
from which section 21-2040.01 was derived. Nebraska case law sets forth a
rule of construction that when construing a statute borrowed from a foreign
state, there is a presumption that the legislature adopted it with approval of
all interpretations given it by the courts of that state in the absence of indicia
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by pro-management Delaware should weigh heavily in bringing
about general acceptance of the Remillard gloss in those jurisdic-
tions which have patterned their statutes after the California
model.
The disjunctive structure of the Nebraska statute can be con-
strued as establishing the fairness test as a separate ground for
affirming an interested director transaction. This interpretation
was followed in an Illinois case 37 in which the validity of a contract
under Delaware's interested director statute38 was at issue. The
executors of the estate of Rumsfield, who was a director of Joanna-
Western Mills, sought to enforce a stock redemption agreement
entered into by the decedent and defendant corporation. The
court found there had been no effective ratification of the agree-
ment but held that the agreement would still be enforceable if it
complied with the statute's fairness test.39 Oregon, whose stat-
ute40 is identical to section 41 of the Model Act, has also construed
the fairness test as a separate ground for affirming interested di-
rector contracts.4 1 Considering the similarity between section 21-
of contrary intention on the part of the legislature. In Re Estate of Thomp-
son, 169 Neb. 311, 99 N.W.2d 245 (1959). The court held in Thompson that the
decisions followed as statutory interpretation precedent need not come ex-
clusively from the highest courts of the other state, "that reported decisions
of trial and intermediate appellate courts are to be considered for whatever
persuasive merit they deserve." Id. at 317, 99 N.W.2d at 251.
This principle of statutory construction was followed in Larson v. State,
161 Neb. 339, 73 N.W.2d 388 (1955), in which the court stated: '"The Criminal
Code of Nebraska was adopted from Ohio and the decisions of the Supreme
Court of that state construing its criminal code are persuasive whenever a
like problem is considered by this court." Id. at 342, 73 N.W.2d at 391. This
method of statutory interpretation should weigh heavily in favor of reading a
Remillard gloss into section 21-2040.01. Since the statute was adopted from
the Model Act which in turn was derived from the California statute, a pre-
sumption should exist that the legislature adopted the Remillard interpreta-
tion in its enactment of section 21-2040.01.
37. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills, 53 Ill. App. 3d 542, 368
N.E.2d 629 (1977).
38. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144 (1974).
39. "In our view 144(a) (3) [the fairness test] is meant to be effective in those
instances where the agreement is known, but the individual director's inter-
est in that agreement is not disclosed." 53 Ill App. at 554, 368 N.E.2d at 638.
The court also held "[tihe burden of proof rests on the interested parties
when 'fairness' alone can sustain the transaction." Id. at 548, 368 N.E.2d at
634.
40. Or. REV. STAT. § 57.265 (1975).
41. American Timber & Trading Co. v. Niedermeyer, 276 Or. 1135, 1146, 558 P.2d
1211, 1218-19 (1976): 'This change would allow the enforcement of contracts
between a corporation and its directors even when it has not been approved
by a disinterested board or ratified by the stockholders, so long as 'the con-
tract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.'"
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2040.01 and the statutes of Oregon and Delaware, it is probable that
the Nebraska courts would also adopt this position.
Ernest Folk, a leading authority on Delaware corporate law, has
maintained that the Remillard gloss is not applicable in Delaware.
It is his view that the purpose and effect of Delaware's statute is to
validate a contract between a corporation and its directors if "any
one of three statutory tests is met."42 Therefore, authorization by
a fully informed and disinterested board precludes any judicial
scrutiny of the transaction's fairness. Folk reasons that the Dela-
ware statute is essentially a codification of the business judgment
rule as applied to interested director transactions.43 Yet, it would
seem that Fliegler v. Lawrence44 has rejected Folk's view. 45 How-
ever, one commentator suggests the decision may be restricted to
situations in which the transaction is approved by interested
shareholders. 46
The Folk interpretation has been followed in a Tennessee lower
court decision.4 7 The case involved a derivative suit brought
against the defendants as directors and majority shareholders.
Defendants had incorporated for the purpose of owning transport
trucks which were in turn leased to the plaintiff corporation. Al-
though the issue before the court was the fairness of the lease
agreement, the court, without citing any outside authority, stated:
"It should be noted that the way the statute reads the transaction
... is not voidable if any of the three subsections apply. '48
Whether the Supreme Court of Tennessee will adhere to this inter-
pretation and preclude any inquiry into a transaction's fairness
when there has been compliance with the statutory approval pro-
cedures is at this time pure conjecture.
The federal district court of New Jersey has construed that
state's interested director statute as requiring compliance with
each statutory test in order to validate a particular transaction.4 9
If the opinion is read literally, it would require a transaction to be
authorized by a disinterested board and ratified by the
shareholders and be found fair and reasonable to the corporation.
42. See E. FoLc, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAw 75 (1972).
43. Id. at 75-81.
44. 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
45. See notes 31-33 & accompanying text supra.
46. Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 2, at 25. However, the court did not seem con-
strained by the fact situation when it held that "[ni othing in the statute...
removes the transaction from judicial scrutiny." 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976).
47. Tennessee Dressed Beef Co. v. Hall, 519 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
48. Id. at 808. This interpretation of Tennessee's interested director statute was
criticized in Recent Developments, Corporations-Duty of Loyalty and Cor-
porate Opportunity-Transactions Between Corporations With Common Di-
rectors, 43 TENN. L. REV. 155 (1975).
49. Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974).
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It is doubtful that such an interpretation would be followed today
by the New Jersey state courts.5 0 However, the holding could be
construed as a rejection of the fairness test as a separate and in-
dependent ground for affirming such transactions.
IV. FAIRNESS
A. The Burden of Proving Fairness
At common law, the burden of proving a transaction's fairness
was placed upon the interested director.51 If a Remillard gloss re-
quiring judicial scrutiny of a transaction's fairness in all circum-
stances is adopted by the Nebraska courts, then what effect does
compliance with the provisions of section 21-2040.01 have in deter-
mining the transaction's validity? Authorization by a disinterested
board or by fully informed shareholders should logically affect the
burden of proving fairness. Otherwise the statutory tests would be
mere surplusage and, as noted earlier, the "entire statute could
just as well have been compressed into the final clause."52 If this
construction is to be avoided, the key to section 21-2040.01 is its
allocation of the burden of proof.5 3 Allocation of the burden is cru-
cial; because of the conceptual problems posed by the fairness
test, the burden of proof would many times determine the contro-
versy's outcome.5 4 Jurisdictions which have addressed this ques-
tion have supplied differing answers.
Clearly the burden of proof is upon the director when there has
been no board or shareholder approval. 55 However, some jurisdic-
50. The federal court's interpretation has been labeled absurd. See Bulbulia &
Pinto, supra note 2, at 211 n.72. They believe that the holding could be ra-
tionalized as viewing the statutory fairness test as procedural, thus a director
showing board and shareholder approval and procedural fairness would have
a less stringent test to prove substantive fairness. Id.
51. The leading case which promulgated this principle was Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295 (1939). It held that when a director's transaction with the corpora-
tion is challenged, the burden is on the director to "show its inherent fairness
from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein." Id. at
306. See also Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 M1. 2d 268, 280-81, 166
N.E.2d 793, 800 (1960).
52. Marsh, supra note 11, at 47. See notes 22-29 & accompanying text supra.
53. The late Carlos Israels viewed burden of proof as the crucial issue to under-
standing the implications of interested director statutes. See Israels, The Cor-
porate Triangle-Some Comparative Aspects of the New Jersey, New York,
and Delaware Statutes, 23 RUTGERS L. Rzv. 615 (1969).
54. Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 2, at 225-26. See notes 71-90 & accompanying text
infra (discussion of the conceptual problems associated with the fairness
test).
55. "The burden of proof rests on the interested parties when 'fairness' alone can
sustain the transaction." Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills,
53 Ill. App. 3d 542, 548, 368 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1977).
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tions maintain the burden of proving fairness is on the interested
director even though there is compliance with the statutory proce-
dures. Iowa adopted this position in Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar:5 6
"Nor does [the interested director statute57 ] modify our common
law requiring a corporation-controlling director, challenged in a
self-dealing situation, to carry the burden to establish his good
faith, honesty and fairness."5 8 California courts also seem to place
the burden of proof upon the challenged director, notwithstanding
statutory compliance.5 9 Adherence to this view essentially inter-
prets the statute as merely a codification of the common law prin-
ciples. 60 Compliance with the statute's approval procedures could
only serve as evidence of the transaction's fairness and reasona-
bleness to the corporation. This position has been justified on the
ground that shifting the burden of proof to those challenging the
fairness of the transaction would be contrary to the approach es-
tablished by Remillard.61 Therefore, compliance with the statu-
tory tests should only have the effect of removing the presumption
of unfairness and merely shifts the burden of going forward to the
plaintiffs.62
In Scott v. Multi-amp Corp.,63 the court interpreted New
Jersey's statute as not relieving the directors of the burden of prov-
ing fairness. Rather, the statute establishes a less stringent stan-
dard for the requisite proof if the interested directors comply with
its provisions. This conclusion was reached through an interpreta-
tion of the Commissioners' Comment accompanying the statute.64
The comment stated that the statute was meant to overrule case
law which had required clear and convincing proof of the transac-
tion's fairness, allowing the courts to deal with such matters under
their general equitable powers. The court held that the statute
substitutes "the 'preponderance of the evidence' test for the 'clear
and convincing' requirement. '65
56. 217 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa 1974).
57. IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (West 1978). The Iowa statute is identical in sub-
stance to section 41 of the Model Act.
58. 217 N.W.2d at 525.
59. Although the question of the statute's effect on the burden of proof has not
been directly confronted, the court has reiterated the principles of Pepper v.
Litton when issues predicated on section 820 have been before the court. See
Mueller v. MacBan, 62 Cal. App. 3d 258, 132 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976); Kennerson v.
Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1953).
60. See note 11 & accompanying text supra.
61. Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 2, at 211.
62. Id.
63. 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974).
64. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8 (West 1969).
65. The portion of the Commissioners' Comment on which the court based its
reasoning read:
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Nebraska case law prior to the current act also required the in-
terested director to establish the transaction's fairness by clear
and convincing proof.66 It could thus be argued that section 21-
2040.01 does not affect the burden of proof established by common
law, but only serves to set a less rigid standard in proving fairness.
Unfortunately section 21-2040.01 was not supplemented with the
clear expression of legislative intent that accompanied the New
Jersey statute.
The final view taken is that compliance with the statute's ap-
proval procedures fully shifts the burden of proving unfairness to
those challenging the transaction. After an extensive analysis of
legislative intent behind the passage of New York's interested di-
rector statute, one author concluded that it shifts the "burden of
proof to the complaining corporation when there is full and fair
disclosure and approval by a vote of disinterested directors or
shareholders." 67
This approach was taken by a federal court applying New York
law to an interested director transaction in Cohen v. Ayers.68 Re-
ferring to the scope of review under the statute, the court stated:
"If either shareholder or director approval was obtained, it is un-
necessary to require the defendants to 'affirmatively establish that
Subsections 14A:6-8(l) and 14A:6-8(2) of this section have been
adapted from section 820 of the California Act and have no counter-
part in Title 14. Substantially similar provisions are contained in the
New York and Delaware Acts. The rule presently in effect in New
Jersey is that any contract or other transaction between a corpora-
tion and one or more of its directors is voidable at the election of the
corporation unless the party seeking to enforce the contract or trans-
action demonstrates by clear and convincing proof that it is honest,
fair and reasonable .... The Commission believed that this rule op-
erates harshly in many cases, and that the rule stated in this section
would eliminate the inequities and uncertainties caused by the pres-
ent rule, leaving undisturbed the power of the courts to deal with
such matters under general equitable principles.
Id.
66. See Price v. Fraser, 119 Neb. 806, 231 N.W. 18 (1930). In Price, the court heldh
"[T]ransactions between corporations having common officers and directors
are presumptively fraudulent, and the burden is on the defendants to sustain
the transaction by clear and convincing evidence that it was fair." Id. at 817,
231 N.W. at 23. This rule was also followed in Rittinger v. Pierpont, 145 Neb.
161, 15 N.W.2d 393 (1944). Although it was stated in terms of common direc-
torates, arguably the rule would apply to other "interested director" transac-
tions. In Gorder v. Plattsmouth Canning Co., 36 Neb. 548, 54 N.W. 830 (1893),
the court held that contracts between a corporation and its directors are not
necessarily void if it is "clear" that the transaction was made in good faith
and beneficial to the corporation. Id. at 556, 54 N.W. at 833.
67. Note, supra note 35, at 1186. See also C. IsRAELs, CoRPoRATE PRACTICE § 9.19
(1974) (expressing the same conclusions respecting section 713).
68. 449 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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the ... transaction was fair and reasonable' when made. ' 69 If the
director is relieved of this burden, the undeniable implication is
that in any challenge to a transaction approved by the board or
shareholders, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving that the
transaction was unfair to the corporation.7 o This position was also
implied in a case construing Delaware's statute when the court
found that "[tihe burden of proof rests on the interested parties
when 'fairness' alone can sustain the transaction."'7 1
Placing the burden of proving fairness upon the interested di-
rector is desirable if protection of shareholder interests is the es-
sential motive of the statute. However, the goal of certainty and
predictability regarding a transaction's validity suffers under that
view. Nebraska courts should be aware that there exists such an
inverse relationship between protection of shareholder interests
and certainty in director transactions when eventually called upon
to construe section 21-2040.01. Resolution of this trade-off will de-
pend on policy decisions. The focus of this policy debate will be
whether the state, in this area, should pursue a pro-management
or pro-shareholder stance.
B. The Fairness Test
The cornerstone of section 21-2040.01 is the requirement that
the transaction be "fair and reasonable" to the corporation. Remil-
lard mandates that fairness be the focus in evaluating transac-
tions between directors and their corporation. The concept of
fairness is elusive; there is no precise test or formula setting forth
its parameters. Fairness in any one case is purely a function of the
facts of that case.7 2 Ironically, the weakness of the fairness test, in
terms of predictability, gives rise to its greatest strength; it allows
courts the flexibility necessary to protect shareholders from a myr-
iad of potentially harmful transactions.7 3
69. Id. at 310.
70. Cohen was decided under the current version of section 713, enacted in 1971.
The language of the new provisions can be read as providing a strong intent
that compliance with the statute's approval procedures will validate even an
unfair transaction. However it seems that the New York courts will still ap-
ply a Remillard gloss to section 713. A review of case law construing section
713 since 1971 revealed that the dicta in these cases indicates "a presumption
on the part of the New York courts that compliance with the section does not
abrogate the fairness doctrine." Note, supra note 35, at 1185.
71. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills, 53 Ill. App. 3d 542, 548, 368
N.E.2d 629, 634 (1977).
72. See id. at 555, 368 N.E.2d at 639 ("In our view, the fairness of the agreement is
a question of fact. . [T]hat fairness must be determined as of the date of
ratification, not the date of execution.") See also 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 919 (perm. ed. 1975).
73. See generally Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 2, at 223-27.
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The law has fashioned various standards in focusing the inquiry
upon a transaction's fairness. The most pervasive test is that ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court in Pepper v. Litton.74
[T] he burden is on the director... not only to prove the good faith of the
transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of
the corporation and those interested therein. . . . The essence of the test
is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the
earmarks of an arm's length bargain.
75
This "arm's length bargain" test is applied by the California courts
under their statute.7 6
A variation of the standard is used by Delaware---"'whether the
proposition submitted would have commended itself to a wholly
independent board of directors. ' 77 New York, according to one
commentator, has adhered to a variety of tests, weaving in and out
between the "arm's length bargain" test and a good faith test.7 8 In
one instance a new test of fairness was formulated in Case v. New
York Central Railroad.79 Assessing the fairness of a transaction
between a parent corporation and its subsidiary, the court ap-
proached fairness with the view that the parties to the transaction
should simply receive what they bargained for.80 This approach to
fairness has been severely criticized, particularly its deficiency in
protecting minority shareholder interests. 81 Another factor in de-
termining fairness is whether there has been full disclosure of the
director's interests. 82 Regardless of which test is adopted by the
Nebraska courts, however, they have in common the effect of
granting wide discretion to the court, thus enabling the fairness
test to envelop a wide number of fact situations.
A corporation's contract with its director should be viewed from
two perspectives. Courts will generally review not only the fair-
ness of the bargain but also whether the bargain is in the best in-
terests of the corporation. These principles were demonstrated in
74. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
75. Id. at 306 (footnote omitted).
76. See Mueller v. MacBan, 62 Cal. App. 3d 258, 277, 132 Cal. Rptr. 222, 232 (1976);
Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 851, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 407 (1965); Ken-
nerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 172,260 P.2d 823, 832
(1953).
77. E. FoLx, supra note 42, at 86. This standard has been allplied in Johnston v.
Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 490, 121 A.2d 919, 925 (Super. Ct. 1956); Harris Trust &
Say. Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills, 53 Ill. App. 3d 542, 555, 368 N.E.2d 629, 639
(1977).
78. Note, supra note 11, at 663.
79. 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965).
80. "[T]he agreement must be looked at with the knowledge which those who
entered into it had when it was executed." Id. at 158, 204 N.E.2d at 647, 256
N.Y.S.2d at 612.
81. Note, supra note 11, at 663.
82. Voss Oil Co. v. Voss, 367 P.2d 977 (Wyo. 1962).
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Fill Buildings, Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton Life83 in which the
court set forth what has been called the "two-tiered standard" of
fairness.8 4 In this instance, defendant corporation challenged the
validity of an assumed lease entered into with Fill Buildings, a cor-
poration owned by a director of the original tenant-corporation.
The tenant-corporation, which subsequently went bankrupt, had
been warned against overexpansion by the state insurance depart-
ment just prior to the execution of the lease. Defendant had as-
sumed the leasehold when it took over the operations of the
original tenant. The court found that the price of the leasehold
agreement was fair but that the interested director could not sus-
tain the burden of proving that the transaction was in the best in-
terests of the corporation.8 5 There was offered no legitimate
business reason why the corporation would enter into such a lease
while in financial trouble.
Given an instance of alleged director enrichment at corporate expense
such as in this case, the burden to establish fairness resting on the direc-
tor requires not only a showing of "fair price" but also a showing of the
fairness of the bargain to the interests of the corporation. Only when a
convincing showing is made in both respects can "fairness" under the stat-
ute be said to have been established.8 u
The court agreed with defense counsel's observation that the sale
of widgets by a director to the corporation would not be "fair" even
though the price was fair, if there was no corporate purpose fur-
thered by the acquisition of widgets.87
Remillard also illustrates that the inquiry into fairness extends
further than an income statement analysis. The year before the
manufacturing companies entered into sales contracts with their
directors' sales corporation, they had profits of approximately
$45,000. The profits received from the sales corporation alone
under the 1948 and 1949 contracts were $78,198 and $47,199 respec-
tively. Despite this financial gain, the court ruled the contracts
"unfair" to the corporation.
It is no answer to say that the manufacturing companies made a profit on
the deal, or that [the directors] did a good job. The point is that those
large profits that should have gone to the manufacturing companies were
diverted to the sales corporation. The good job done by [the directors]
should and could have been done for the manufacturing companies. 88
83. 396 Mich. 453, 241 N.W.2d 466 (1976).
84. Simpson & Burnett, Business Organizations, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 349,363 (1977).
85. The burden of proof was expressly placed on the director under the Michigan
statute in force at that time. This case exemplifies the importance of which
party bears the burden of proving fairness; in this instance it was outcome
determinative.
86. 396 Mich. at 461, 241 N.W.2d at 469 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. n.7.
88. 109 Cal. App. 2d at 419,241 P.2d at 74. The inquiry taken by the court is analo-
gous to that taken under the doctrine of usurpation of corporate opportunity.
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The final aspect of the fairness test involves the time at which
the fairness of the transaction is to be judged. This determination
may be critical. A slight change in circumstances may render a
transaction which is fair today unfair tomorrow. The statutes of
California, New Jersey, New York, and Delaware assert that fair-
ness is to be judged at the time the transaction is approved or rati-
fied.8 9 Theoretically, a transaction which was fair when approved
could not later be overturned if circumstances change and the cor-
poration is left with the bad end of a bargain. This possibility has
led to the conclusion that these statutes are concerned with proce-
dural, not substantive fairness. 90
Section 21-2040.01 leaves this question open, only requiring that
the transaction be fair and reasonable to the corporation. As a re-
sult, Nebraska courts would be free to view the substantive fair-
ness of the transaction at dates 'subsequent to its approval. It
could be argued that it is unfair for a director to reap a greater than
expected profit at the corporation's expense due to a change in cir-
cumstances-that a transaction between a corporation and its di-
rector must always be a continuing symbiotic relationship. Much
will depend upon which standard the court will use in assessing
fairness. For example, if the "arm's length bargain" test is
adopted, it would necessitate that fairness be judged at the time
the transaction was approved. However, courts should be free to
assess the fairness of a continuing transaction at any point in the
life of the transaction due to the lack of constraint in the statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The enactment of section 21-2040.01 has not eliminated the un-
certainty associated with interested director transactions. Absent
judicial interpretation, the statute raises as many questions as it
resolves. This uncertainty is intensified by the divergent interpre-
tations given to those statutes after which section 21-2040.01 was
patterned.
It is probable that the Nebraska courts will adopt the approach
expressed in Remillard, requiring director transactions to be fair
and reasonable to the corporation. With such a gloss placed on the
statute, the real key to section 21-2040.01 will be procedural.
The same fact situation may state a cause of action under both interested
director and corporate opportunity legal theories. See Tennessee Dressed
Beef Co. v. Hall, 519 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). This similarity between
the two doctrines is analyzed in E. Fou, supra note 42, at 89-93.
89. CAL. CORP. LAw. § 820 (West 1955) (superseded by CAL. CORP. CODE § 310
(West 1977); DEL CODE tit. 8, § 144 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8 (West
1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 713 (McKinney 1963) (amended 1971).
90. Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 2, at 219.
924 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:909
The dilemma in providing a degree of certainty in interested di-
rector transactions while retaining the maximum amount of share-
holder protection can best be reconciled by viewing section 21-
2040.01 as a procedural tool, the burden of proving the fairness or
unfairness of the transaction being dependent upon whether there
was compliance with the statutory guidelines for board or share-
holder approval.
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